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Same Dance, New Stage? The AU–EU Relationship at 25 and What Must Change

Updated: Aug 8

There are moments that call for diplomacy, and moments that call for directness. This one calls for directness. 

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“Twene anim da hɔ a, yɛnnbɔ nkyɛn.” - Akan Proverb

Translated: When the face of the drum is right in front of you, you don’t strike the side.

 


Part Two of a Conversation

“When we say Africa is the future… whose future is it becoming?” Bah Traoré, Shaping Futures Academy Fellow

 

That question, asked to me by my colleague during a break at the Shaping Futures Academy, refused to let go. It followed me from Bonn into late-night reflections, through a few research rabbit holes, some annotated margins, and now two blogs deep, but I’m still circling it.


This post follows my earlier blog, Africa is the Future, But Who Holds the Pen?”, where I reflected on Africa-Europe partnerships through the lens of climate justice and geopolitics. That piece focused on the European Union- its promises, power asymmetries, and green ambition.


Now, the spotlight shifts inward:


If Africa demands fairness and co-authorship from Europe, are we ready to lead ourselves?

Because if we are asking for fairness, for co-authorship and mutuality, then the African Union, our Union, must also rise to the moment.


Brussels, Berlin: The Missing Chair?

During our visit to Brussels and Berlin as Shaping Futures Fellows, the African Union’s name came up often but they weren’t in any of the rooms. Not at the Commission, not in Parliament, not even at think tank roundtables. No AU representatives engaged with us directly.


Thankfully, we engaged some amazing thought leaders and organisations working on the African continent. At the Robert Bosch Academy, we had the pleasure of engaging with brilliant African voices like Rose Ngugi and Lindiwe Sibanda, who brought rich insights on youth engagement and food systems. We also spoke with APRI, a dynamic “think-and-do tank” with a strong footprint on the continent. But overall, African institutional presence from embassies, permanent representatives, to NGOs was absent.


This blog is my way of drawing the AU into this conversation. As we approach the 7th AU–EU Summit in Luanda, and reflect on 25 years of the AU-EU partnership, the question is no longer just about Europe’s role.

It’s also about whether the African Union is ready to lead and more pointedly, about what kind of leadership this moment demands.


Where the AU Could Lead: Power Levers and Missed Opportunities


Let’s begin with how Africa is viewed globally and how that hurts Africa in many ways…


Who tells the story, shapes the story

“Africa is too often defined by its risks and not its contributions.”- Hanan Morsy, UNECA (2025)

Perception shapes power, really. The stories told about Africa shape how the world engages with Africa, how markets price us, how partners negotiate with us and even how we see ourselves.

It’s the reason why Africa pays over $4.2 billion each year in inflated borrowing costs not because of real economic instability but because of persistent global assumptions that treat “Africa” as a single high-risk asset class (Africa Practice, 2024). It’s why a coup in Niger can rattle Kenyan bond markets, thousands of kilometers away. And it’s why we receive only 2% of global clean energy investment, despite having the best solar potential on Earth (IEA, 2023)


When African innovations make headlines, they are treated as anomalies rather than evidence of systemic capability. But they are there. Take for example, Morocco’s Noor solar complex, which is one of the largest in the world. Or Kenya’s off-grid solar revolution. What about Gabon’s pioneering role in carbon markets? Or Seychelles’ blue bond that broke new ground for ocean finance?


We must couple these developments with narrative power. If others continue to frame us primarily through poverty, fragility, and need, then even our progress will be undervalued, both politically and financially.


There’s a saying in my language:

“Nea ɔsua wo no, ma wo hwene bɔ.”

Loosely translated: “Whoever tells your story, determines (alters) how you are portrayed”


It is time the African Union stepped up as a narrative institution. That means resourcing our own data ecosystems, challenging outdated credit rating metrics, shaping the algorithms that determine what images and headlines the world sees about Africa and standing unapologetically in the complexity of a continent of 55 nations, not one basket case.


Because when the story is told right, the terms of engagement will change.


Now let’s talk about AfCFTA…


From Trade Pact to Geopolitical Tool

When the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was signed in 2018, the excitement was palpable. Finally, we had a bold African-led move to stitch together fragmented markets, unlock intra-African trade, and build economic muscle beyond extractives and export dependency. With 54 signatories, it promised to become the world’s largest free trade area by membership.


This was quite a revolution!...well, on paper. We are six years in, and we are yet to see the transformation promised.


Under the Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) (AfCFTA’s pilot to get goods crossing borders), 31 countries are trading under AfCFTA rules (up from 7 in 2022). That’s no small feat. More than 100 shipments have moved under AfCFTA rules, covering everything from batteries to sugar and ceramic tiles (UNECA, 2023). This sounds like the AfCFTA dream is finally manifesting. However, Intra-African trade still hovers between 15-18%, compared to 60-70% in Europe and Asia (Afreximbank, 2023; UNCTAD, 2023). The structures have been established, but the flow is slow.


So what is holding things up?


Some will point to slow customs modernisation, non-tariff barriers, or technical hiccups in harmonising rules of origin and yes, all of that is true. As of end-2023, just under 90% of tariff lines had agreed rules of origin, with key gaps in sectors like pharmaceuticals, textiles, and automotives.


But let’s be honest: this isn’t just a technical problem. It’s also political one. AfCFTA is being treated like a policy instrument, when it should be a geopolitical strategy.


Imagine this for a moment with me:

→ Africa showing up to the WTO or COP as one trade bloc and not 55 fragmented voices!

→ AfCFTA as a climate-trade negotiator, demanding carve-outs under CBAM and influencing green industrial subsidy rules!

→ A continental strategy to leverage critical minerals into manufacturing clusters, powered by shared infrastructure and green zones across regional corridors.


That’s the kind of power the EU wields. Why not us?


With AfCFTA, Africa can anticipate, perhaps even influence, global shifts and stop being reactionary. But that requires some boldness, also on the part of member countries. It means member states giving up a bit of sovereignty to gain a lot of power. I can only hope the AU, with its member states, will have the cohesion and clarity of vision required to achieve this.


So called critical minerals: Are they leverage or latest loot?


Talk about electric vehicles, solar panels, wind turbines, digital devices. These are all energy transition actions sweeping the globe. They all have one thing in common though: they run on minerals that Africa has in abundance. This is a well-known fact. From cobalt in the DRC to lithium in Zimbabwe, manganese in Gabon, and rare earths scattered across the continent, Africa is powering the green future.


The DRC alone supplies over 70% of global cobalt and Africa hosts 30% of the world’s reserves for green-critical minerals. Yet over 90% of this leaves the continent unprocessed, benefiting others while Africa remains stuck in raw extraction.


Despite frameworks like the African Mining Vision (2009) and the new AU Action Plan on Critical Minerals (2023), implementation lags.


Meanwhile, the EU’s new Critical Raw Materials Act (2024) names over a dozen African minerals as “strategic” but makes no binding commitment to local beneficiation or green industrial zones on the continent.


While the EU, U.S., and China are aligning their critical mineral supply chains with geopolitical urgency, Africa remains fractured in its response, still negotiating mine by mine, not as a bloc.


What then can be the AU’s move?


A Pan-African Critical Minerals Strategy, anchored in AfCFTA protocols, could:

  • Harmonise mining codes and pricing benchmarks

  • Enforce joint venture requirements for local processing

  • Demand technology and IP sharing for green tech

  • Create an African stockpile and reserve pricing model, similar to OPEC, but for lithium and cobalt

  • Enforce clean mining standards and strict environmental governance


Some movement is already happening. Zambia and the DRC are collaborating on a battery value chain. Ghana is exploring lithium partnerships. But these efforts remain fragmented. A continental approach is needed if Africa is to move from being the extraction site of the world’s clean future to being its industrial co-author.


Because the paradox is this: Africa is rich in the very things the world needs to decarbonise. But without strategy and solidarity, those same things will be stripped out, leaving Africa more dependent and less developed. But let’s not be the new resource frontier in someone else’s green revolution.


Finally, let’s talk MONEY. Unfortunately, the AU Can’t Speak Freely…Yet


Financing Sovereignty:

The African Union’s ambitions are repeatedly undercut by one inconvenient truth: it remains financially dependent on the very powers it is meant to negotiate with. That contradiction limits how boldly it can move and how loudly it can speak.

Here’s what the numbers tell us:

  • 60% of its annual budget comes from external donors.

  • The EU alone has contributed 30-40% in recent years.

  • The Kigali Financing Decision (2016), which proposed a 0.2% import levy to fund the AU independently, remains under-implemented with only 17 countries complying as of 2023

So now, to a very uncomfortable question: When your major funder is also your major negotiation partner, can you really push back?

Can you confront unfair trade deals? Can you reject climate finance conditionalities? Can you lead on pan-African priorities without quiet vetoes from foreign funders?

The answer, right now, is largely no.


It’s therefore no coincidence that:

  • The AU has struggled to mount a coordinated position on Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM)

  • Or push for just energy transition pathways that prioritise adaptation, not just mitigation

  • Or demand fairer financing terms for Africa’s green and industrial future


Without fiscal autonomy, the AU is structurally limited in its ability to be bold, to coordinate member states, or to lead decisively at forums like COP, WTO, or G20.


Some Bold Ideas Worth Considering:

  1. Make compliance with the AU levy a condition for voting rights:

  2. Countries that fail to meet their contribution commitments shouldn’t enjoy full rights at AU decision tables.

  3. Create a pan-African Credit Rating Agency to challenge the biases inflating Africa’s borrowing costs:

  4. Global rating agencies consistently over-penalise African countries for political risk, sometimes even when the fundamentals are solid. A regional alternative could challenge this bias, build trust among African investors, and de-risk internal investment flows.

  5. Launch green bonds backed by sovereign wealth funds channelled into AfCFTA infrastructure and youth innovation:

  6. Several countries, including Botswana, Nigeria, and Ghana, have SWFs. A pooled infrastructure or innovation fund, directed towards AfCFTA trade corridors, green energy manufacturing, or youth innovation zones, could accelerate transformation on our own terms.

  7. Limit donor funding to non-political portfolios:

  8. Let development partners fund technical cooperation, research, and health, but not core political organs or summits. Africa must control its political narrative, not just its spreadsheets.

·       Integrate diaspora remittances and philanthropy into long-term finance planning:


Remittances to Africa were projected at over $100 billion in 2024 (nearly 3x the size of all foreign aid combined). The AU should explore sustainable instruments such as diaspora bonds, crowd-funded challenge funds, and matched grant platforms, to redirect some of that capital toward continental priorities.

 

Because thruthfully: you cannot build sovereignty on borrowed money. If the AU is to lead boldly into the next 25 years of Africa- Europe relations and into global green transitions, it must start by owning the table it negotiates from which means owning its own purse.


Conclusion: The AU–EU Summit Is a Checkpoint, Not a Celebration


If Agenda 2063 is still the African North Star, then Luanda is a checkpoint. We are being presented with a moment to ask:


Is the African Union still content to be a passive participant in global affairs, or is it ready to act like the global player Africa needs it to be?


Because from climate finance and trade justice to critical minerals, Africa has what the world needs. But resources without strategy get exploited. And strategy without unity is only noise.


The EU is not waiting. China is not waiting. The world is re-aligning around green energy, new trade rules, digital governance, AI, and strategic labour flows. And so, as we prepare for the next leg of the Shaping Futures Academy in Accra, this time just steps away from the AfCFTA Secretariat, I hope we get to ask some harder questions.


What will it take for Africa to write its own story and not just be footnoted in someone else’s?


We keep saying the future belongs to Africa. The real question is: where will Africa belong in its own future? Hopefully not on the margins, and not as a symbol, but as a force, at the centre, shaping the future its people hope for.

 

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DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of Governance and Development Advisory, Leiden University, the Shaping Futures Academy, or any institutions mentioned. This piece is written in a personal capacity to contribute to critical dialogue on the AU–EU partnership and climate justice.


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